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Abstract
The expansion of online social media (OSM) and networked information
technology (NIT) use has coincided with reinvigorated democratic
movements around the world, including the toppling of authoritarian
governments in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. This paper examines the
variety of uses for Twitter during the Egyptian revolution, as Hosni
Mubarak’s regime collapsed in less than three weeks after 30 years in
power.
To achieve this analysis, this paper first divided the revolution into
Fisk’s four stages of political crisis. Next, the authors extracted 37,634
tweets containing key words from an archive of 16 million tweets
collected from January 23-February 8, 2011. It then identified 14
categories of tweets (including Call to Action, Information Sharing,
Expression of Support, and Opinion) by manually annotating a randomly
selected sample of nearly 6,000 sent during the uprising. This manual
annotation allowed the authors to develop category-specific patterns.
After entering these patterns into a Java program, the authors ran an
Automatic Content Analysis that tallied the number of tweets in each
category per stage of political crisis. By correlating the Content Analysis
results with the known chronology of the revolution, the results provide
the answers to several questions regarding the use of Twitter during the
political crisis.
Throughout the revolution, Twitter was primarily used as an
information-sharing tool, distributing news, updates, and critical
information to protesters. As the crisis progressed, however the uses of
Twitter adapted to various government policies and developments in the
uprising. This examination of Twitter use can also serve as a stepping
stone for other political or information scientists interested in studying the
networked public sphere (NPS) and how the use of technology affects
political movements.
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Introduction
Since December 17, 2010, the world has closely followed the series of
uprisings in countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
collectively known, and popularly described, as the Arab Spring.
Persistent demonstrations ousted two of the region’s most established
authoritarian leaders, Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s
Hosni Mubarak, in under two months, laying the foundations for
democratic reform. Though the international media has consistently
praised the critical role played by networked information technologies
(NITs) including the Internet, mobile phones, and online social media
(OSM) in the organization of the protests, there is little quantitative
evidence to support these claims. Due to the relative youth of NITs, few
studies have empirically examined the effectiveness of NITs as
mobilization or information-sharing tools, especially during this particular
political crisis. The 18-day revolution in Egypt provides an ideal
opportunity to corroborate the alleged role of Twitter in the Arab Spring as
well as to enhance our understanding of the functions and nature of the
networked public sphere (NPS), an emerging public forum “composed of
a seamless web of analog and digital, wired and wireless technologies”
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that together create a platform for discussion and information-sharing
(Han, 2012).
This paper analyzes how the various uses of Twitter contributed to
the unprecedented mobilization of protesters and the collapse of
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. It does this by first applying Fisk’s
theory of the four stages of political crisis (Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic,
and Resolution)1 as a framework for the Egyptian uprising. To examine
the role of Twitter in each of these stages, this paper downloaded and
analyzed the content of 37,613 relevant tweets collected from January 23
to February 8, 2011, from the NIST’s Tweets2011 archive. By manually
annotating a randomly-collected sample of 5,312 tweets, twelve categories
of Twitter use were identified. Based on these categories, an Automatic
Content Analysis program was developed to account for how the Twittercreated NPS was used in the revolution. This paper expects the results of
the Automatic Content Analysis to answer the following questions:

1) What kinds of roles did Twitter play in the collapse of
Mubarak’s regime in Egypt?

2) What kinds of information were shared over the Twitter-created
NPS during the Egyptian political crisis?
1

Han (2009, 2011) applied Fisk’s theory of four stages in political crises
into his analysis on how Korea’s youth attempted to impeach President
Lee’s decision to resume the importation of American beef, which was
known for “mad cow disease” in the NIT-created NPS
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3) What kinds of actions were called for over the Twitter-created
NPS?

4) Was the Egyptian government’s implementation of a total
Internet blackout an effective policy? How did Twitter users adapt
to the policy?

5) How did demonstration effects from the Tunisian revolution
affect Twitter use in the Egyptian case, given the movements’
geographic and temporal proximities? How could the use of
Twitter influence the Arab Spring in other countries?

6) Is the Twitter-created NPS inherently interactive or one-sided in
nature?

This paper finds that Twitter served as a diverse and interactive tool for
communication, facilitating the expression of general information, critical
information for and actual calls to action, and opinions. Furthermore, this
study provides significant insight as to how Twitter can affect politics in
authoritarian regimes where pro-democracy movements are likely to occur
in the near future. More generally, due to the unprecedented amounts of
data created daily by OSM, studies on the use of Twitter and other OSM
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in political contexts will require the combined expertise of social and
information scientists. The analyses and conclusions provided in this
paper are meant to be a step toward a deeper understanding of the Twittercreated NPS and our understanding of its political implications.

Young Generations and Life Politics in Egypt
A factor commonly cited in the success of the Arab Spring was the
primary role of youths in the initial series of critical demonstrations that
led to the collapse of the regime in Egypt. Mervat Madkour, a professor at
Cairo University, explained that the crowds in Tahrir Square, the epicenter
of the protests, were made largely of young Egyptians who organized
themselves online (Madkour, 4/15/2012). These protests were initially
called for on Facebook, marking January 25, the National Police holiday,
as the date of anti-government demonstrations. Yet many Egyptians were
uncertain of the seriousness and legitimacy of the protests. Fathya
Eldakhakhny, a journalist in Egypt during the revolution, has stated that if
no one had participated on the first day of planned protests, then the
movement would likely have amounted to nothing (Eldakhakhny
4/15/2012). Yet these fears were proven to be unfounded when thousands
of young Egyptians poured into the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other
major cities. Once the movement gained momentum, other Egyptians,
most notably the poor and disadvantaged who were not technologically
literate, saw an opportunity to create change in their society. Essentially,
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the protests began in the NPS and took on a life of their own once they
were actualized in the streets.
But how critical were the young generations’ contributions and
why did the movement succeed? Previous generations had attempted to
enact democratic and political reform, yet were unsuccessful. This
uprising was unique in both in its rapidity and its leaderless nature. This
paper finds that the use of NITs, specifically Twitter, was a major element
in both of these unique factors, by facilitating the spreading of information
and the mobilization of protesters. It focuses on two key factors that
contextualize the role of Twitter during the revolution, highlighting how
their interactions brought on the political crisis. These factors are the
emergence of:

1) A large, technologically-savvy young generation in Arab
societies, and

2) Life politics as a new motivation of social and political actions
among this young generations.

In 2011, 61% of Egypt’s 82 million people were under age 40, with the
country’s median age at 24.3 years old, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau’s International Database (See Table 1 on page 11). This large
percentage of the population had known no other leader than Mubarak,
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and was growing dissatisfied with Egypt under his repressive regime.
Historically, Egyptian presidents Nasser and Sadat had both led the
country with dynamic national visions. Under Mubarak, as Tarek Osman
states, “the new generation never fought (or witnessed) a war; never lived
with a national project; [or] grew up at a time in which the country was
undergoing a surgical transformation” (Osman, 2010: 203). Mubarak
emphasized national security and economic liberalization policies upon
entering the office in 1981, but his harsh repression of dissent and other
political tactics were not legitimized by a unifying national vision that had
permitted his predecessors to take similarly repressive actions.
The failure of Mubarak’s security-based strategy was not
necessarily reflective of his policy, but rather of the shift in political
motivations from emancipatory politics to life politics (Giddens 1991, Han
2011). Throughout Egypt’s history, emancipatory politics dominated the
political landscape, through such movements as drives for independence
and nationalist ideals. Under Nasser, for example, major political dissent
disappeared for the sake of national unity, progress, and independence
from Great Britain. Most Egyptians accepted this intrusion of liberty as
long as it clearly served the goals of the state in the early phase of nation
building. Emancipatory politics were driven by powerful individuals
whose personal lives mirrored the nation’s struggles and served as an
inspiration to the society. Today, however, while political ideologies and
charismatic figures are still relevant and influential, the driving force
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behind modern political movements has changed to life politics, the set of
issues that directly disrupt the life of an individual or that individual’s
network of acquaintances (Han 2011). Contemporary political movements
founded in life politics can include complaints over issues of corruption,
socioeconomic deterioration, and a lack of freedoms, among others.
In Egypt, ordinary citizens suffered as a result of an unequal or
underperforming economy and social issues affecting individuals in their
lives. Table 1 shows Egypt’s performance in a number of categories
relating to life politics:

Table 1 – Life Politics Indicators in Egypt
Median
Age

24.3

Inflation
Youth
GDP Per
Capita PPP Unemployment (2010)
(2007)
(2010)
$6,200

24.8%

11.10%

Corruption
Youth
Score
Literacy Rate
(2011)
(2005-10)
82% (Female)
88% (Male)
3.8

Data sources: CIA World Factbook, UNICEF, Transparency International

The first indicator is GDP per capita (with purchasing power parity). In
2010, Egypt ranked 137th out of 227 countries and territories as calculated
by the Central Intelligence Agency. Having had the authority to
implement an effective policy for economic liberalization since 1981,
Mubarak failed to improve Egypt’s economy in a substantially beneficial
way. Though the economy was improving overall, many citizens felt
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alienated because they did not personally experience the benefits of this
improvement.
A second indicator is unemployment among youths age 15-24.
Unemployment is perhaps the most obvious of life politics indicators,
given that it provides individuals with an income and ability to perform a
duty and support a family. The rate of 24.8% is very high, especially
considering that the overall unemployment rate is 9%. That the rate is
higher among youths is not unusual, yet with nearly one quarter of Egypt’s
young people unemployed, frustration over this fundamental life politics
issue was certain to decrease satisfaction with Mubarak’s economic
policy.
Additionally, it must be noted that inflation was one of the most
influential factors in the Egyptian uprising was inflation. According to the
CIA, Egypt had an inflation rate in 2010 of 11.10%, and was ranked 205th
out of 222 countries and territories. The rising cost of food and other
goods further complicated and disoriented those who were unemployed.
A higher literacy rate has traditionally been considered an asset to
economic development and an improvement in a country’s life politics
conditions, but in Egypt, as the increased literacy rate among the young
generation actually worsened the impending crisis. Though a gender gap
exists in Egyptian education, the age gap is much more notable. The
overall literacy rate in Egypt is 66%, according to UNICEF data, but
among youths that number increases to 88% for males and 82% for
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females. The enormous disparity in education between the youth and the
older generations gave young people the intellectual means to understand
the extent of Mubarak’s failures on issues of life politics. Additionally,
the number of college graduates increased greatly in Egypt. With a free
education system, Egypt had created a young generation of “highly
Westernized…youths from disadvantaged backgrounds…exposed to the
world in ways that expand aspirations and ambitions” (Osman, 2010: 222).
The dismal post-graduate unemployment opportunities increased
frustration among the young generation.
The final life politics indicator examined in this paper is
corruption. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
measures and ranks the countries of the world on a scale of 0-10,
according to how corrupt their public sectors are perceived to be. North
Korea and Somalia have the most corrupt governments, with a score of
1.0. New Zealand and Denmark have the least corrupt governments, with
scores of 9.5 and 9.4 respectively. Egypt is ranked 112th of 164 countries,
with a score of 2.9. This indicates that the public sector is perceived as
very corrupt. This corruption further undermined the perceptions of the
Mubarak regime as a legitimate authority acting in the best interest of the
Egyptian people.
Ultimately, Mubarak’s regime failed to satisfy the basic needs of
its people. These needs were previously ignored in favor of nationalist
pride under the traditional social, religious, and cultural foundations of
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older Arabic societies. In fact, his emphasis on telecommunications policy
as a means of economic improvement served to undermine his own
legitimacy by providing young generations with the ability to
communicate and share these life politics struggles. According to the
Egyptian government’s May 2011 report “The Future of Internet
Economy,” people under age 18 made up 35% of Internet users, and those
aged 18-34 made up an additional 43% of Internet use meaning that 78%
of users were under the age of 34.2 With so many issues
disproportionately affecting youth, the consolidation of public opinion
against the regime was developed through shared reactions and sentiments
to specific events. In Egypt, several incidents facilitated connections and
trust between activists and their supporters, through both demonstration
effects and Fisk’s Prodrome stage, which will both be explained in the
following sections.
Through the development of NITs as a tool for communication
among the young, educated population, the underlying causes of the
Egyptian revolution evolved into a consolidated effort to bring down the
Mubarak regime in 2011. How did NITs become an actor in political
movements? To answer this question, this paper examines several
previous cases of political crises instigated by a young generation and NIT
use that provided demonstration effects for the Egyptians in Tahrir Square
and elsewhere.

2

http://mcit.gov.eg/Upcont/Documents/TheFutureofInternetEconomyIII.pdf
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Demonstration Effects: Twitter Revolutions in Tunisia, Moldova, and
Iran
Han (2009) describes the demonstration effect as a series of five steps that
allow a large number of individuals to realize the power of collective
action as a result of previous actions, especially in the context of the
networked public sphere. First, there must be a non-political event that
garners a great deal of attention among NIT-users. Second, public
discussions over the NPS serve as an alternative to traditional media.
Third, the results of those discussions are expressed through both new and
traditional media. Fourth, the movements become political as activists
consolidate and increase their understanding of the power they wield
through test-run mobilizations. Finally, the process ends with the
construction of a “generational identity and consensus” (Han, 2007). Han
uses demonstration effects to explain how small groups of devoted and
motivated activists can be catalysts for action by larger groups, a
framework that can directly apply to the Egyptian case in 2011. Both the
Moldovan and Iranian uprisings in 2009 likely provided demonstration
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effects for Arab youths due to both the temporal proximity and the similar
use of OSM as an effective mobilization tool.
In his analysis, Han (2007) describes how the demonstration effect
transformed previously apolitical and disparate young generations in
South Korea into a politically cohesive unit through a series of nonpolitical test-run mobilizations in 2002. After watching the
disqualification of a Korean athlete in the 2002 Olympics, angry Korean
youths brought down the official website of the Utah Winter Olympics by
flooding the website with traffic. This development was then covered by
global new media outlets such as CNN, BBC, and the New York Times
(Han, 2007). Realizing the power they could wield as a group, young
Koreans and the politicization of their social networks led to inherently
political actions and campaigns. Given the youth’s dominant use of NITs,
particularly Twitter and other OSM, the Moldovan and Iranian precedents
served as test-run mobilizations for the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in both
Tunisia and Egypt. The Tunisian revolution almost certainly informed the
activists in Egypt on how to use OSM effectively to enact political change.
The direct effect is evident in that the Egyptian revolution began less than
two weeks after Ben Ali’s departure from the Tunisian presidency.
On April 6, 2009, the Communist Party in Moldova declared
victory in parliamentary elections, despite pre-election projections of a
close result. Opposition groups Hyde Park and ThinkMoldova, alleged a
fraudulent election and met to discuss a demonstration for the following
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day. According to the New York Times3, organizers were surprised by the
sudden gathering of 10,000 protesters, having hastily disseminated
information through text messages and social media. The demonstrations
turned to riots as protestors set fire to government buildings. An election
recount was taken, though the results remained ultimately unchanged.
This spontaneous unrest demonstrated to Twitter users that NITs could be
legitimate and potentially powerful mobilization tools.
It was another case of election fraud in Iran just two months later
that ignited a torrent of political unrest. Incumbent President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad declared victory only hours after polls closed. Opposition
figures and activists complained immediately, calling for protests and a
fair election. Protesters filled the streets, garnering international media
attention due to the country’s size and regional influence. For the next
two months, the Iranian government tempered media coverage of the
unrest, while pro-Ahmadinejad militias enforced stability4. Videos and
images captured by citizen journalists reached major media outlets
through NITs like Twitter and Facebook, increasing awareness of the
repression as well as intensifying international pressure on the Iranian
regime. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the revolutionary unrest in Iran
provided a precedent for NIT action in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries.

3

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/europe/08moldova.html?pagewanted=all
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-07-25/world/iran.world.protests_1_iranian-americanpresident-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-iranian-embassy?_s=PM:WORLD
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The 2011 Tunisian revolution directly inspired Egyptians to action
and provided demonstration effects for the Egyptian activists. In the wake
of the Tunileaks scandal, in which diplomatic cables exposing the
opulence of Ben Ali’s family were stolen and released online, Tunisians
were very aware of the disconnect between the regime and its people. On
December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, the 26-year-old street vendor, lit
himself on fire outside of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid,
Tunisia5. Locals protested and called for rallies in solidarity with
Bouazizi, whose misfortunes and complaints were widely shared by other
young Tunisians. As the government struggled to control the dispersal of
information over NITs and attempted an ill-fated publicity campaign, the
protests spread. Using the keyword #Sidibouzid, protesters relayed
revolution-related materials to both fellow protesters and the outside
world. Ben Ali made several televised statements, instituting minor
reforms and using traditional state-controlled media to threaten to apply
the law “in all firmness” with regard to silencing the unrest.6 Protests
continued to grow despite Ben Ali’s best efforts, and by January 8, the
country had become dangerously unstable. Resorting to violence, security
forces fired on protesters, killing several protesters. By January 13, the
crackdown ended, and Ben Ali declared a state of emergency before

5

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.ht
ml
6

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/01/egypt-bomb-kills-new-year-churchgoers
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fleeing the country with his family the following day.7 The success of the
Tunisian revolution provided a direct and immediate example of a country
using OSM such as Twitter to bring about democratic change in a country
that had known only authoritarian leadership since its independence from
France in 1956. Interestingly, the Tunisian case also adhered to Fisk’s
four stages of political crisis that this paper also applies to the movement
in Egypt starting less than two weeks later.

The Egyptian Revolution
It took less than 20 days for Mubarak to transition from one of the most
stable political leaders in the MENA region to a defeated dictator. The
revolution can be divided into several clearly defined stages that follow
Fisk’s four stages of political crisis: Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic, and
Resolution. Before this paper analyzes the contents of the tweets
exchanged during each stage, it explores what happened with regards to
the major events and mobilizations that brought about the end of
Mubarak’s regime. Despite the similarities between the Tunisian and
Egyptian revolutions, there are several notable differences. First, it must
be noted that the Egyptian military was much more involved in decisionmaking than was its Tunisian counterpart. Mubarak’s departure was part
of a coup conducted by the military establishment reacting to the protests.
During the later stages of the crisis, the army also played an important role
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests
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in stabilizing the protests in Tahrir Square. Also, the motivations of the
Egyptian uprising were more immediately political, given Ben Ali’s recent
departure. Egyptian activists capitalized on the momentum begun in
Tunisia, mobilizing their educated cohorts over life politics issues and
general dissatisfaction.

Prodrome
Keeping these two ideas in mind, this section examines four major events
as important indicators of the Prodrome stage. This stage consists of the
series of events that signal an impending political crisis. In April 2008,
Internet organizers created the April 6 Youth Movement, a Facebook group
that served as a forum for complaints and revolutionary ideas. Leaders of
this group were often arrested or intimidated by the Mubarak regime. The
second event was the murder of blogger and activist Khaled Said in the
summer of 2010, which resulted in public outrage and protests against
police brutality. Third was the destabilizing Alexandria church bombing
on January 1, 2011, and fourth was the success of the Tunisian revolution
on January 14.
On April 6, 2008, a massive protest by workers in Mahalla alKobra, Egypt, was suppressed by security forces.8 Four protesters were
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http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/
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killed and 400 arrested. On March 23, the April 6 Youth Movement was
created on Facebook to gather support for the protests. According to
research by PBS, the expansion of the group was viral. “The group
invited about 300 people to join its Facebook page; within a day it had
3,000 members and within a few weeks, 70,000 had joined the call for
strikes across Egypt in support of Mahalla’s workers” (Inside the April 6
Movement, PBS). The group remained active in calling for antigovernment strikes and actions through the 2011 revolution. The creation
of this group indicates both the existence of demonstration effects and the
Prodome stage of the political crisis.
The extent of the corruption and police brutality in Egypt was
manifested in the case of Khaled Said, a young Internet activist who had
posted videos of corrupt police activity online. According to reports, in
June 2010, Said was confronted by police officers in an Alexandria
Internet café, taken outside, and beaten. He later died of the severe
wounds inflicted by the officers. His family, upon seeing his body,
captured a cell phone image of his injuries and posted the picture online.
Young Egyptians were outraged, and Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian Google
Executive helped found a Facebook group named We Are All Khaled
Said.9 The group raised awareness of Said’s death and expressed
solidarity with his family. Along with the April 6 Youth Movement
Facebook group, We Are All Khaled Said served as a major mobilization
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http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/61266
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tool during the revolution. Though the detainment of dissidents and the
censorship of NITs was not uncommon in Egypt, Said’s death contributed
to the anti-government momentum that would converge on January 25,
2011.
After the public outrage over Said’s death had largely subsided,
another Prodrome incident occurred, further heightening dissatisfaction
with the government. On January 1, 2011, a bomb exploded outside a
Coptic Church, killing 21 people. According to The Guardian, hundreds
of the Christian sect’s members protested in the streets. President Hosni
Mubarak made a statement on state television promising to “cut off the
hands of terrorists and those plotting against Egypt’s security.” 10 This
issue was interesting for two reasons. First, it created actual unrest and
demonstrations, indicating that an outbreak event was going to arrive
soon. Second, it was a perfect representation of why young Egyptians did
not support Mubarak. His regime depended so heavily on security policy
that when it briefly failed, it exposed his weakness in the areas of life
politics.
The final Prodrome event was the Tunisian Revolution. Egyptian
activists followed the Tunisian case with great interest, having suffered
from many of the same life politics deficiencies. The protesters’ victory in
Tunisia provided both the framework and inspiration necessary for
Egyptian activists to call for their own protests. Using the Twitter hash
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tag #Jan25 (representing the day of the planned protest), activists knew
that successful protests were possible. It was this first planned day of
protests that propelled the political crisis into Fisk’s second stage.

Outbreak
The outbreak of the Egyptian crisis began on January 25, the country’s
national police holiday, as thousands of protesters gathered in various
locations around Egypt, marching toward Tahrir Square. Many prominent
opposition groups had announced their intentions to participate in the
protests. The organizers were unsure of how successful their plans would
be, with journalist Fathya Eldakhakhny going as far as to say that if no one
had fulfilled their commitments on the first day, the revolution would
likely never have begun (Eldakhakhny, 4/15/2012). In Cairo, small
protests converged in Tahrir Square, which became the epicenter of the
revolution. The protests remained relatively peaceful, although sporadic
clashes led to the deaths of three protesters and one police officer,
according to Egypt’s Interior Minister. Despite the early political
aspirations of the protesters, there was no widely accepted set of demands
and goals.
On January 26 and 27, the protests persisted. A violent police
response in Suez increased fears and uncertainty around the movement.
Access to OSM was limited in an attempt to isolate protesters. Police used
tear gas and rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse demonstrators, as
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Tahrir Square became a popular destination for protests. According to The
Guardian, foreign journalists were intimidated and beaten to prevent the
international community from accessing accurate and unbiased
information related to the protests.11 Anticipation was building for even
larger protests called for January 28. The protests were on the verge of
entering Fisk’s chronic stage, in when the unrest extends from a single
outbreak event into a prolonged political crisis with potentially devastating
results.

Chronic
The chronic stage began in the first minutes of January 28, when each of
Egypt’s five major Internet Service Providers had shut off their services
entirely within half an hour. Only one ISP, Noor, maintained service for
another two days due to its important role in the Egyptian economy.
These developments led to international confusion and fears of a
massacre. As fragments of information escaped, Internet activist groups
like Anonymous published and distributed lists of strategies to circumvent
the Internet block. 12
While some clashes broke out on the January 28 “Day of
Departure”, no extensive violence marred the movement. On this day,
Mubarak fired his government, promising reforms and appointing Omar

11

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/27/egypt-riot-security-force-action
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http://www.abdolian.com/thoughts/?p=4699
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Suleiman as Vice President. 13 While this was intended as a concession,
Suleiman was a well-known security advisor and strongly disliked by
protesters. As anti-Mubarak demonstrations intensified, the Egyptian
military intervened to provide security, serving mainly to deter violence in
Tahrir Square. On February 1, organizers called for a “March of a
Million” that was intended to force Mubarak from office. Masses of
protesters spilled into Tahrir Square, only to hear Mubarak announce his
intention to step down after overseeing a transition of power.
The momentum shifted away from protesters on February 2, when
violent clashes broke out across the country. Internet service was restored
throughout the day on February 1, and Vodafone reported that its services
had been forced to send pro-Mubarak messages. These messages
reportedly called for a final assault on the anti-Mubarak demonstrators in
Tahrir. Later on February 2, heavily-armed pro-Mubarak activists, some
on camel and horseback, fought with opposing protesters as the military
watched. 14 Foreign journalists were attacked as the regime blamed
external influences for the violence. The seemingly organized violence
did not last, and the Tahrir movement was not defeated. Vice President
Suleiman began negotiations with opposition representatives on February

13
14

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/30/egypt-protests-hosni-mubarak-power

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/02/hosni-mubarak-supporters-violencecairo
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6, resulting in several concessions including a 15% wage increase for
public sector employees. 15
A final momentum shift occurred with the February 7
release of Wael Ghonim, who had been detained during the first
days of the revolution.16 Pressure continued to build on Mubarak as he
continued to concede minor political reforms to the protesters. On
February 10, rumors spread that Mubarak would step down after U.S.
President Barack Obama’s call for an immediate transfer of power to a
democratic regime. However, Mubarak’s much-anticipated speech
stubbornly repeated his intention to step down at the end of his term. With
the momentum on the side of the protests, the resolution of the crisis was
near.

Resolution
On February 11, just one later, Vice President Suleiman appeared on state
television, announcing Mubarak’s resignation.17 The demonstrators in
Tahrir Square and around the country celebrated as the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces took power from Mubarak. Human Rights Watch
reported that over 300 Egyptians were killed throughout the country since

15

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/07/egypt-cabinet-announces-salariespensions-rise
16

17

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/08/wael-ghonim-tahrir-square
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo
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the beginning of the revolution.18 Though Mubarak fled to Saudi Arabia,
the military has maintained the preeminent role in decision-making. The
institution’s reluctance to relinquish power has led to protests that
continued long after the resolution of this particular crisis. By correlating
the results of the Twitter content analysis with Egypt’s chronology
according to Fisk’s four stages allows us to obtain a clearer picture of the
role that the Twitter-created NPS can play in future revolutionary
movements.

Reading Categories of Tweets from the Egyptian Revolution
Dataset
The NIST Tweets2011 archive is comprised of 16 million tweets collected
from January 23 to February 8, 2011. The tweets serve as a primary
account of the Egyptian revolution, and a content analysis helps us verify
the chronology as well as explain how Twitter was used during the
uprising. This paper created a database of 37,613 chronologically ordered
tweets identified by major hash tags used by protest organizers
(#Sidibouzid, #Tunisia, #Jan25, #Egypt) and others that commonly
appeared alongside them (#Tunisie, #Tahrir, #Cairo, #Mubarak,

18

http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/08/egypt-documented-death-toll-protests-tops-300
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#Revolution, #Arabspring). #Sidibouzid and #Jan25 were used by protest
organizers to identify tweets relating to the Jasmine Revolution protests in
Tunisia and Egypt respectively. The information contained in the
database reveals the date and time the tweet was sent, a specific Twitter
ID, and the message content of the tweet itself.

Natural Language Processing and Automatic Content Analysis
To get the most information out of this dataset, this paper conducts an
Automatic Content Analysis of the 37,613-tweet database (Han, 2012).
This entails the creation of a Java program that identified tweets based on
extracted key patterns (or micro-expressions) within a tweet’s actual
message. While this research strategy was based off of Han’s (2012)
analysis of the Twitter-created NPS and its response to Obama’s health
care initiative, it attempts a slightly different and more nuanced approach.
In Han’s automatic content analysis, patterns were collected and used for
two purposes: 1) to identify the sentiment of tweets, whether in support of
or against the health care bill, and 2) to analyze tweets in a single “Call-toAction” category. The research in this paper attempts to conduct a more
complicated automatic content analysis, looking at a variety of categories
and how their fluctuations can expound upon the existing chronology in
Egypt. Also, the sentiment of Twitter users was so overwhelmingly
favorable toward the anti-Mubarak protesters that a sentiment analysis
would not provide useful information.
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Automatic content analysis is just one strategy within the larger
method of analyzing the Twitter-created NPS known as natural language
processing (NLP). NLP involves the creation of a computer program that
can automatically identify the sentiment of tweets and categorize them,
according to multiple languages, the intention of sender, and additional
factors. Although this will likely be an effective way to conduct research
related to the Twitter-created NPS in the future, this paper did not have
access to sophisticated natural language processing technology. By
developing its own patterns to be used for an automatic content analysis,
this paper was able to adapt the analytical strategy to this particular case,
the Egyptian revolution. This research can provide some insight into the
use of Twitter in this specific case while also serving as a stepping-stone
to future NLP research.

Creating Analytical Categories
The first step toward performing an automatic content analysis was to
identify key categories and patterns that would be used to differentiate
between those categories. This was achieved through the manual
annotation of tweet samples. The researchers extracted random samples
of tweets from each of the political crisis stages reflected in the archive
(see Table 2):

Table 2 – Tweets Manually Annotated for Category Development
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Political Crisis Stage
Prodrome
Outbreak
Chronic (Blackout)
Chronic (Post-Blackout)
Total

Dates
Jan. 23-24
Jan. 25-27
Jan. 28-Feb. 1
Feb. 2-Feb. 8
Jan. 23-Feb. 8

Manually Annotated
339
1,958
1,533
1,482
5,312

Total Tweets
339
4,534
15,939
16,827
37,639

The Prodrome stage includes tweets from January 23 and 24, given that
the archive began collecting tweets on January 23 and the Outbreak stage
began on January 25. This accounts for the relatively small sample size in
the Prodrome stage. The Outbreak stage would last for three days, until
January 28. The Chronic stage was divided into two sections: Blackout
and Post-Blackout. On January 28, the Chronic stage began when
Mubarak’s Internet censorship policy was implemented while the largest
protests yet flooded major city centers. The Chronic (Blackout) stage
lasted until the end of February 1, when Internet and mobile phone service
were restored. The Chronic (Post-Blackout) stage lasted until the end of
the archive on February 8. This division is unique to the Egyptian case
and was used to examine the effects of Mubarak’s unprecedented
censorship policy. It must be noted that the dataset excluded the
Resolution stage because the crisis was resolved on February 11. Random
samples were annotated from each of the three stages: 313 from the
Prodrome stage, 1,958 from the Outbreak stage, 1,533 from the Chronic
(Blackout) stage and 1,482 from the Chronic (Post-Blackout) stage.
Each of these samples was physically annotated by the researchers
to develop relevant and distinct categories. Manual annotation also
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provides a more intimate and accurate understanding of the tweet’s
primary intention than would a computer program. Therefore, the results
of this manual annotation should accurately reflect Twitter use during the
uprising. From the manual annotation, 6 major categories were developed
(See Table 3).

1.0 The first major category, Information Sharing (IS) involves tweets that
are intended to inform others of events or updates regarding the
revolution. This is a broad category, and therefore is divided up into four
subcategories: General Information Sharing and Updates, Critical
Information for Call to Action, Demonstration Effects, and Request for
Information.

1.1 The first subcategory is General Information Sharing and Update, or
(GIS/UP). This category is used for the most basic information sharing
that could either express general facts or situational updates. It also
contains updates from CNN, Reuters, Al Jazeera, or other traditional
media organizations that covered the Egyptian uprising. This GIS/UP
tweet, from the prodromal stage, provides an update regarding the protests
in Tunisia that reemerged after Ben Ali’s departure.
“Confirmed sources report #libya military deployed to #tunisia
border. More info will be posted as it comes in #sidibouzid #war”
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1.2 The second subcategory is Critical Information for Call to Action
(CICTA). This category includes tweets intended to directly share
actionable information with demonstrators. For example, many tweets
discussed locations of particular protests, police tactics, or strategies for
circumventing the Internet blackout. By providing the IP numbers at
which these websites were accessible, this tweet directly helped protesters
access updates about the progress of the uprising:
“RT @mimistim Please RT: #Egypt only blocking DNS. For
Twitter: http://128.242.245.248 For Facebook: http://69.63.189.11”

Table 3 – Titles and Definitions of Analytical Categories
Table 3 – Titles and
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1. Information Sharing
1.1 General Info
Sharing/Update
1.2 Critical
Info for Call
1
To Action
.
1.3 Demonstration
Effect
1
1.4 Request for
Information
.
2. Call To Action
2.1 Direct
CTA
3
2.2 Retweet/Internet
Action
T
2.3 Link/Video/Photo
h for Support
2.4 Call
e
3. Expression
of Support
4. Opinion
5. Irrelevant
6. Arabic
t

IS
GIS/UP Provide non-specific info about protests for the
purpose of informing readers
CICTA Mention specific location and activities, tactical or
safety info with the intent of helping protesters
DEMO Specify about the relationship between the
Egyptian Revolution and other events, past,
present, and future events that have influenced or
been influenced by the unrest
REQ
Questions regarding events, opinions, and
responses
CTA
DIR
Ask individuals to perform physical actions to
either support or participate in protests
RET
Requesting interactive Internet action (ie. Share,
Follow, Spread)
LINK
Requesting non-interactive action by providing link
to photos, videos, or articles
CS
Requesting assistance or calling for international
action
ES
Statement with pro-demonstrator sentiment
O
Individual perspectives on events
IR
Unrelated or non-Arabic foreign language
ARB
Relevant and in Arabic language

hird subcategory is Demonstration Effect (DEMO). This contains tweets
that relate the revolution in Egypt to unrest in countries around the world.
In terms of previous demonstrations, this mostly includes tweets regarding
the Tunisian revolution, but also commonly included the 1988 Tianamen
Square democracy protests in China. Many of the tweets related to other
Jasmine Revolution protests include the names of countries where unrest
was occurring, such as Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. An example of a
DEMO category tweet is:
“RT @AfriNomad: “Yesterday we were all Tunisian. Today we
are all Egyptian. Tomorrow we’ll all be free” #jan25 #Egypt”
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1.4 The final information sharing subcategory is Request for Information
(REQ). This includes any questions Twitter users asked regarding events
in Egypt during the revolution. There is a large variety of requests,
ranging in specificity. One example of a tweet from REQ category is:
“Is it confirmed? RT @nmoawad #Twitter was blocked in #Egypt”

2.0 The next major category is Call to Action (CTA). These types of
tweets ask readers to perform a variety of actions, from demonstrating in
the streets to pressuring their own governments. This category is also
divided into four subcategories: Direct Call to Action, Retweet and
Internet Action, Link/Video/Photo, and Call for Support.

2.1 The Direct Call to Action subcategory (DIR) includes tweets that ask
others to participate in physical actions. This mostly included calling for
protests in Egypt, but solidarity protests in other countries were also
advertised on Twitter. The following tweet clearly states a time and
location for a physical action, inviting the readers to participate in the
action:
“Please spread this as much as possible; any1 that gives anyother
locations tell them all 2 head 2 ta7reer [Tahrir Square] we’ll meet
there at 12 #jan25”
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2.2 The second subcategory is Retweet and Internet Action (RET). This
entails tweets that ask for readers to participate in an interactive way. In
the Twitter-created NPS, asking readers to “retweet” means to copy the
message, enabling it to reach the maximum number of social networks.
Tweets also called for readers to “spread the word” or “share with
friends”. This is an inherently interactive CTA. For example:
“SMS ur friends, ppl are gathering in ElSa3a sqr! SMS and RT
Quickly. #Jan25 #Egypt”

2.3 The third subcategory is Link/Video/Photo (LINK), which calls for
actions that are not inherently interactive. They provide articles, videos or
pictures from the protests that spread awareness of the events in Egypt.
These tweets often explicitly state “Read this” or “Amazing picture.” For
example:
“High quality pics of the demonstration http://goo.gl/rJUxC #Jan25
#Egypt #Tahrir”

2.4 Call for Support (CS) is the final CTA subcategory. Instead of asking
the reader to perform a specific action, these tweets request direct and
indirect support to help the protesters in Egypt. This can include asking
for medical supplies to tend for the wounded or concise requests for help.
For example:
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“SUEZ IS A KILLING ZONE AND completely LOCKED
DOWN SAVE US (RT) #Jan25 #Egypt #25jan”

3.0 The third major category is Expression of Support (ES). This, as the
name suggests, involves senders who are expressing solidarity with
protesters. It ranges from criticisms of Mubarak to respect for the
demonstrators. One example of the ES category:
“Good Morning, #Egypt. Love and solidarity coming your way
from around the world as your prepare for #Jan25 protests. Be safe
Be Free!”

4.0 The fourth category is Opinion (O). This category consists of tweets
that contain phrases such as “I think” or “I believe”. An example of an O
tweet is:
“US is clearly trying to play both sides: government &amp;
people. I think that means it believes uprising can topple Mubarak
#jan25 #egypt”

5.0 The fifth category is reserved for those tweets that are irrelevant (IR).
This includes tweets that are not related to the uprising as well as nonArabic foreign language tweets. In the automatic content analysis, this
category is represented by those tweets uncategorized by the program.
The tweets have become essentially unrelated to the crisis, although a

37
more developed language processing program could shed light on the
multilingual uses of Twitter during a political crisis. An example of an
irrelevant tweet is:
“The cat in the hat in Egypt = the Sphinx. :)”

6.0 The sixth category is Arabic tweets (ARB). This category presents a
problem for interpretation because the Automatic Content Analysis
program could not read languages other than English. A small set of
keywords was translated from English into Arabic. This set of words was
then used to identify Arabic tweets related to the revolution. Due to the
inability to translate large numbers of Arabic tweets, the ARB category
does not provide directly actionable data. However, the quantity of tweets
in each stage can provide some information to verify the chronology of the
uprising.

Automatic Content Analysis Methodology
Having identified the twelve categories and subcategories that would be
used to organize the dataset, the next step was to create a computer
program capable of identifying categories. The program required patterns
that differentiated each category. As stated previously, the patterns were
obtained during the manual annotation and were expressed in the same
format as those in Han’s (2012) Obama health care Twitter analysis (Han,
2012: 16). For example, the key patterns “gather yourselves”, “meet
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here”, or “join us” are just a few that would indicate the DIR category, as
they call for direct physical action. Each category was given a varying
number of patterns determined by what was found during the manual
annotation.
Next, the first set of patterns was put into the program, creating a
rough draft of results. This initial draft was used to inform a second
version, when more patterns were inserted to increase the accuracy and
coverage of the program. For example, the DEMO category used the
pattern “Tunisian effect” in the initial draft. After displaying negligible
results, related patterns “Tunisian demonstration” and “domino effect”
were added. This allowed the program to include more tweets in its
analysis. Over- and underrepresentation for individual categories were
consistent problems, being a byproduct of individual expression and the
program’s level of sophistication.
After a preliminary version of the program was created, results
were gathered and the program was tested for accuracy and coverage.
Modeled after Han’s (2012) error sampling strategy, three samples of
tweets were selected (100, 200, and 200 tweets) from the overall dataset
(Han, 2012: 17). These samples were manually annotated and categorized
according to the reader. Subsequently, the sample groups were run
through the automatic content analysis program and the results of the two
analyses were compared. After each iteration, revisions were made to
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create a more inclusive program. Table 4 contains the results from the
third error test.

Table 4 – Final Error Testing Results
GIS/UP
CICTA
DEMO
REQ
DIR
RET
LINK
CS
ES
O
IR
ARB
Not Matched

200M
50
13
2
13
2
6
29
5
11
22
15
32
0

200A
49
50
7
20
0
17
57
10
5
10
0
18
48

Accuracy
98%
26%
29%
65%
0%
35%
51%
50%
45%
45%
0%
56%
N/A

As is clear from Table 4, issues regarding the program’s accuracy and
coverage of the dataset were not effectively resolved during the revision
process thus far. While some categories, such as GIS/UP, boast a very
high accuracy rate (98%), the majority of the other categories are seriously
flawed. This is likely a result of several factors. In addition to the
language barrier, there are other limits to this research that must be
addressed to help illuminate areas of improvement for future studies.
First, determining the intentions of the sender is difficult, even during
manual annotation, given that “tweeters express opinions by referring to
persons or events, or by striving for originality of expression” (Han, 2012:
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11). Though the intentions of many tweets are explicit, the categorization
of tweets is often relatively subjective.
Also, this paper must further define the difference between tweets
and patterns, and develop a program that can effectively differentiate
between the two. While the manual annotation went through the tweets to
find their primary goals (1 Tweet equals 1 Category), the automatic
content analysis simply extracted patterns (1 Tweet can equal 1 or more
Categories). This means that tweets containing multiple patterns were
recorded more than once in the automatic content analysis. This is an
issue because the program could not identify more specific information
about these multiple-pattern tweets. One example of a manually annotated
multiple-pattern tweet is:
“RETWEET RETWEET RETWEET SUEZ LIVE NEW VIDEOS
PRAY FOR EGYPT! http://bit.ly/ftBjdX #voiceleaks #egypt
#jan25 #we #the #people”

This individual tweet fits into the categories of Retweet/Internet action
(RETWEET), support (PRAY FOR EGYPT!), and Link/Photo/Video
(LIVE NEW VIDEOS). In this paper, multiple category tweets are
included in each relevant category. Though marked as a RET tweet in the
manual annotation, the automatic content analysis program would identify
at least three categories from this single tweet. Though it is not possible to
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glean information on the identity of individual tweets that belong to
multiple categories, the number has been calculated.
Yet the inaccuracy of this paper’s automatic content analysis
program does not necessarily preclude this paper from examining
important trends in Twitter use over the duration of a political crisis. By
comparing the results of the initial manual annotation (Table 5) with the
automatic content analysis results (Table 7), the trends are monitored and
analyzed in the following section.

Presentation and Analysis of Results
The results of the manual annotation and automatic content analysis reveal
that Twitter use does indeed reflect the progression of the political crisis
from the Prodrome through the Chronic stage. This section presents an
analysis of the Twitter-created NPS during the Egyptian Revolution. The
interaction of the twelve categories can be used to explain the uprising in
an as of yet unobserved way.
According to Table 5, there are a number of key trends that can be
observed and explained both within each stage and throughout the
duration of the Egyptian political crisis. During the Prodromal stage, from
Jan. 23-24, the prevalence of information sharing is clear, making up
nearly one-third of tweets annotated in this stage. Many of the updates are
regarding either the recently deposed Tunisian leader Ben Ali or the
January 1st church bombing in Alexandria. Also prominent is the DEMO
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category, which contains examples of the Tunisian revolution and praises
the role of social media in the success of the uprising in Tunisia.

Table 5 – Manual Annotation Results – Measured in Tweets

1.0 IS
A
1.1
m
GIS/UP
o
n1.2
gCICTA
1.3
tDEMO
h1.4 REQ
e
Subtotal
C
T
A2.0 CTA
2.1 DIR
s
u2.2 RET
b
c2.3 LINK
a
t2.4 CS
e
gSubtotal
o
r
i3.0 ES
e
s4.0 O
,
5.0 ARB
L
I6.0 IR
N
K
TOTAL
i

Prodrome

Outbreak

Chronic (BO)

Chronic
(Post-BO)
Jan. 28-Feb. 1 Feb. 2-Feb. 8

Jan. 23-24

Jan. 25-27

105
(18.5%)
1
(0.2%)
63
(10.9%)
7
(1.2%)
176
(30.8%)

482
(24.6%)
102
(5.2%)
68
(3.5%)
68
(3.5%)
720
(36.8%)

544
(35.6%)
121
(7.9%)
38
(2.4%)
44
(2.9%)
747
(48.8%)

396
(26.7%)
113
(7.6%)
30
(2.1%)
55
(3.7%)
594
(40.1%)

1,533
(27.7%)
337
(6.1%)
199
(3.6%)
174
(3.1%)
2,243
(40.5%)

4
(0.6%)
12
(2.1%)
32
(5.2%)
0
(0%)
48
(7.9%)

74
(3.8%)
108
(5.5%)
129
(6.6%)
39
(2%)
350
(17.9%)

38
(2.5%)
68
(4.4%)
93
(6.1%)
7
(0.5%)
206
(13.5%)

63
(4.2%)
51
(3.4%)
140
(9.4%)
18
(1.2%)
272
(18.2%)

179
(3.2%)
239
(4.3%)
389
(7%)
64
(1.2%)
871
(15.7%)

9
(1.6%)
25
(4.3%)
174
(30.1%)
147
(25.4%)

191
(9.8%)
82
(4.2%)
584
(30%)
31
(1.6%)

79
(5.2%)
168
(11%)
308
(20.1%)
25
(1.6%)

122
(8.2%)
105
(7.1%)
337
(22.7%)
52
(3.5%)

401
(7.2%)
380
(6.9%)
1,403
(25.3%)
254
(4.6%)

579
(100%)

1,958
(100%)

1,533
(100%)

1,482
(100%)

5,552
(100%)

Total
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According to Table 5, there are a number of key trends that can be
observed and explained both within each stage and throughout the
duration of the Egyptian political crisis. During the Prodromal stage, from
Jan. 23-24, the prevalence of information sharing is clear, making up
nearly one-third of tweets annotated in this stage. Many of the updates are
regarding either the recently deposed Tunisian leader Ben Ali or the
January 1st church bombing in Alexandria. Also prominent is the DEMO
category, which contains examples of the Tunisian revolution and praises
the role of social media in the success of the uprising in Tunisia.
Among the CTA subcategories, LINK is by far the most popular,
with 5.1% of the total. Links, photos, and videos are helpful ways for
Twitter users to share a story longer than can fit in one 140-character
Twitter message. During this stage, many of the links connected the
reader to articles regarding the issues highlighted in the information
sharing tweets. As mentioned previously, the IR tweets, which contain
languages other than Arabic and English, were relatively high in this stage
because the manual sample was so small that it required the researchers to
include tweets with an expanded set of keywords to analyze properly. The
number of Arabic tweets was also fairly high, making up over 21% of the
Prodromal stage. This is to be expected, however, as the lack of language
technology prevents further analysis and division of Arabic tweets by their
contents.
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The Outbreak stage saw several changes in category prevalence.
While GIS/UP maintained the most prominent role in the Twitter-created
NPS, fluctuations among other categories provide some insight into how
Twitter use changed. CICTA rose to 5.2%, a sizeable increase from its
.2% in the Prodromal stage. This increase is not surprising, given the
necessity of important information in the early stages of a political crisis.
These tweets often expressed the locations of protests or police,
undoubtedly assisting other protesters and their participation in the
January 25 events. Call to Action tweets also increased greatly during the
Prodromal stage. DIR, RET, and LINK all increased, indicating the
emergence of a large interactive movement on the ground that was
reflected through Twitter use. Finally, while the DEMO, DOM, CS, and
O categories remained relatively low, tweets expressing support for the
protesters jumped from 2.9% in the Prodromal stage to 9.8%. ES tweets
encouraged the protesters in Egypt to persist in their drive for democracy,
assuring them that they were not alone in the struggle.
Mubarak had just initiated the Internet blackout when the Chronic
stage began on January 28. By isolating his country from the NPS, several
changes occurred in Twitter use. Information sharing categories rose to
higher levels than before, with GIS/UP accounting for over 35% of the
tweets. Many of these tweets involved informing others around the world
of the Internet shutdown, raising awareness and galvanizing Internet users
from around the world. Also, the CICTA category continued to rise.
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Much of this critical information consisted of advice on how to access the
Internet or circumvent the blackout in other ways, from dial-up
connections to ham radios and satellite phones. Additionally, LINK
tweets continued to be the most common CTA category, though the
blackout limited the amounts of pictures and videos that could escape
from Egypt. ES tweets fell to 5.2%, while opinion tweets rose nearly 7%
as stunned Internet users around the world reacted to Egypt’s Internet
censorship. Most telling, the number of Arabic tweets dropped
dramatically. While some international companies worked to provide
Internet services to Egyptians, the shutdown policy was effective in
silencing most online voices inside Egypt. However, the policy was
counterproductive in that it consolidated public opinion outside of Egypt
and also cost the Egyptian government tens of millions of dollars in lost
business.
The blackout was lifted on the morning of February 2, but this was
not an indication of Mubarak’s impending resignation. As pro-Mubarak
demonstrators poured into Tahrir Square in Cairo, clashing with the antigovernment protesters, the relationships between the categories changed
once again. GIS/UP remained the highest category, with over 26% of the
tweets manually annotated during this stage. LINK and ES experienced
increases, as pictures and videos emerged from Egypt for the first time
since the Outbreak stage. In the midst of the violence on February 2, call
for support tweets increased with protesters asking for medical assistance
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as well as international pressure on the regime. Solidarity protests were
planned at Egyptian embassies around the world, indicated by the increase
of DIR tweets from 2.5% to 4.2%.
Overall, it is clear that GIS/UP dominated the Twitter-created NPS
during the Egyptian political crisis, making up over 27% of the total
manually annotated tweets. Foreign language and Arabic tweets make up
the next largest segment with the whole variety of categories
indeterminable from each other. The second tier of readable categories
consists of CICTA, RET, ES, and O. This result is interesting because it
suggests that that the Twitter-created NPS is not so much a tool for
physical mobilization, but rather one for Internet action and solidarity.
While only CICTA and RET could provide any real assistance for people
in Egypt, ES and O tweets provided confidence to the protesters. The
sense of solidarity encouraged the protesters to continue pursuing their
democratic interests despite the power of the regime.
But would the results of the automatic content analysis reflect a
similar progression of Twitter use throughout the crisis? Despite the
aforementioned inaccuracies and issues, there were similarities between
the results. First, the prevalence on information sharing remains clear. To
correctly interpret the data from the automatic content analysis, it is
important to refer to Table 6, which explains the number of tweets put
through the program.
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Table 6 – Total numbers of tweets read by Automatic Content Analysis
Program

Total
T Entered
Matched
h
Number
of
Category Hits
e

Prodrome

Outbreak

313
190
295

4,534
3,240
4,939

Chronic Chronic
(Blackout) (Post-Blackout)
15,939
16,827
11,390
12,497
17,819
19,757

Total
37,639
27,336
42,844

The first row contains the total number of tweets present in the hash-tag
filtered dataset for each political crisis stage. There were 313 tweets in the
Prodromal stage, 4,534 in the Outbreak, 15,939 in the Chronic (Blackout),
and 16,827 in the Chronic (Post-Blackout). This creates a total of 37,613
tweets in the dataset. The second row explains how many tweets were
matched into categories by the program. This value does not take into
account the possibility of multiple category tweets. In the Prodromal
stage, for example, 190 of the 313 overall tweets were matched to one or
more of the categories, while in the Outbreak stage, 3,240 of the 4,534
overall tweets were matched to one or more of the categories.
Though our program could not identify the specific categories
involved in multiple category tweets, the third row provides insight as to
how many tweets fit into multiple categories. For example, in the
Prodromal stage, while only 190 tweets were matched, 295 patterns were
recognized. This implies that 105 patterns were a part of multiple
category tweets. And in the Outbreak stage, though only 3,240 actual
tweets were matched, 4,939 patterns were recognized, implying that 1,699
patterns were a part of multiple category tweets. Overall, though only
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27,336 of the 37,613 tweets in the dataset were matched, 42,844 patterns
were recognized. This means that 15,508 patterns were part of multiple
category tweets. This explains why the number of total category hits
exceeds both the number of matched tweets and the number of tweets.
Table 7 – Automatic Content Analysis Results for Patterns Recognized
Jan. 23-24 Jan. 25-27 Jan. 28-Feb. 1 Feb. 2-Feb. 8
1.0 IS
1.1
48
717
3,904
3,243
Y
GIS/UP
(25.3%)
(22.1%)
(34.3%)
(26.0%)
1.2
19
799
3,052
5,033
eCICTA
(10%)
(24.7%)
(27.0%)
(40.3%)
1.3
8
140
589
505
tDEMO
(4.2%)
(4.3%)
(5.2%)
(4.0%)
1.4 REQ
25
296
1,258
1,346
(13.2%)
(9.1%)
(11.0%)
(10.8%)
Subtotal
100
1,952
8,803
10,127
a
(52.6%)
(60.2%)
(77.3%)
(81.0%)
c
2.0 CTA
c2.1 DIR
o2.2 RET
r2.3 LINK
d2.4 CS
iSubtotal
n
3.0 ES
g
4.0 O
5.0 ARB
t
oTotal
Category
Hits

Total
7,916
(29.0%)
8,904
(32.6%)
1,245
(4.5%)
2,926
(10.7%)
20,991
(76.8%)

0
(0%)
26
(13.7%)
115
(60.5%)
6
(3.2%)
147
(77.4%)

20
(0.6%)
584
(18.0%)
1,252
(38.6%)
182
(5.6%)
2,038
(62.9%)

21
(0.2%)
1,544
(13.6%)
4,569
(40.1%)
657
(5.8%)
6,791
(59.6%)

12
(0.1%)
1,479
(11.8%)
4,773
(38.2%)
805
(6.4%)
7,069
(56.6%)

53
(0.2%)
3,634
(13.3%)
10,725
(39.2%)
1,651
(6.0%)
16,063
(58.8%)

4
(2.1%)
9
(4.7%)
35
(18.4%)

105
(3.2%)
305
(9.4%)
539
(16.6%)

546
(4.8%)
944
(8.3%)
735
(6.5%)

540
(4.3%)
978
(7.8%)
1,043
(8.3%)

1,195
(4.4%)
2,237
(8.2%)
2,358
(8.6%)

295
(100%)

4,939
(100%)

17,819
(100%)

19,757
(100%)

42,844
(100%)

49
Table 7 displays the results of the automatic content analysis. As in the
manual annotation, IS remains the most popular category, with 49% of
patterns matched belonging to that major category. Yet the emergence of
CICTA as a major subcategory during the Outbreak stage and its
persistence throughout the crisis is notable. CICTA rose from 6.4% to
16.2% during the Outbreak stage, and increased even more as tweets
informed Egyptians on how to gain Internet access, avoid police, or even
treat wounds. The percentage of DEMO and REQ tweets remained
approximately the same throughout the crisis.
Yet according to the automatic content analysis, the CTA category
was also very popular. This is largely due to the dominance of the LINK
category, as it contains any patterns with an “http://” link as well as
articles, photos, and videos of the protests that were not broadcast by
Egyptian state television. DIR patterns consistently composed less than
1% of their respective stages. The RET category experienced a peak
during the Outbreak stage with 11.8% of the total patterns, yet returned to
approximately 8-9% during both Chronic stages. Many of the RET tweets
from the Chronic (Blackout) stage call for mass distribution of information
to raise awareness of Egypt’s blackout policy. However, Egyptians
requesting Internet actions in the Post-Blackout Chronic stage likely
replaced these. One popular RET during the post-blackout stage was
regarding a journalist who had been arrested, and the hash-tag #freeayman
was used to increase external pressure on the security forces. Mr. Ayman
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was freed shortly after. The RET category provided a channel through
which quick and easy interactive international action in support of the
protesters could be taken.
The ES remained fairly low, though it reached its peak at 3.1%
during the blackout. People outside of Egypt saw the extreme measures
taken by Mubarak and wanted to offer support for the protesters. Opinion
patterns peaked during the Outbreak stage at 6.2%, when Twitter users
were excited about the possibility of Egyptian protests. Having just seen
the success of the Tunisian crisis, Twitter users optimistically expressed
their personal views on the emerging crisis in Egypt.
Relevant Arabic tweets provide some of the most interesting
information for the use of Twitter by Egyptians. During the Prodrome,
11.9% of tweets contained relevant Arabic patterns, reflective of the
hangover from the Tunisian case, and interest in planned Egyptian protests
on January 25. In the Outbreak stage, the percentage of Arabic patterns
dropped slightly to 10.9%, as non-Arabic speakers took notice of the
massive mobilizations in Egypt. During the blackout, relevant Arabic
patterns drop precipitously, to 4.1%. While still able to communicate, the
blackout policy was largely effective in muting the reports from Egypt. In
the wake of the blackout, the percentage of ARB patterns rose to 5.3%,
still much lower than its peak. This perhaps represents the maturation of
the uprising, from one primarily mobilized and organized online to one
primarily actualized in the streets.
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It is important to note that the IR category (Table 8) was calculated
in a slightly different way to accommodate the data. In the case of the
automatic content analysis, the IR tweets were counted as those not
matched by the program. In the Prodrome, 190 of the 313 were matched,
leaving 123 as IR. In the Outbreak stage, 3,240 of 4,534 were matched,
resulting in 1,294 IR tweets. The Chronic (Blackout) stage contained
4,549 IR tweets, and the Post-Blackout stage contained 4,330. This left a
total of 10,296 IR tweets, equivalent to 27.3% of the total dataset. This
suggests the impact of the revolution on Twitter, given that the percentage
of tweets related to the Egyptian unrest declines sharply after the Prodome
stage. This is logical given that the crisis had not yet begun, and few
international English-speaking Twitter users were discussing the
upcoming events.

Table 8 – IR/Unmatched Tweets, according to the Automatic Content
Analysis

6.0 IR/Not
C
Matched
r

Prodrome

Outbreak

123
(39%)

1,294
(28.5%)

Chronic
(Blackout)
4,549
(28.5%)

Chronic (PostBlackout)
4,330
(25.7%)

Total
10,296
(27.3%)

Critical Information Sharing and the Egyptian Revolution
Despite the accuracy and overall detection problems regarding the
Automatic Content Analysis program, the results of this paper’s research
is useful in determining the use of Twitter during the Egyptian revolution.
The prevalence of Information sharing is notable. This implies that
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Twitter was not primarily a tool for mobilization, but rather one for
spreading information, both general and critical, to protesters and outside
observers. The spreading of information is a vital component to any
revolutionary movement. Considering that the government felt the need to
shut down the Internet to hurriedly silence communication between
protesters and the NPS, the effectiveness of Twitter and other OSM as
tools for political change is clear. Without information, there would be no
way for protesters to know where to go, find updates on the progress of
the program, or even understand their level of personal safety. As Fathya
Eldakhakhny explained, residents of Cairo were unsure of what was
happening just outside of their houses (Eldakhakhny 4/15/2012). The
national news was ignoring the movement, repeating the message of
stability. Yet the people observed increasing chaos and instability. The
revolution, which began as little more than a gathering of disenfranchised
and educated youths to express complaints about police corruption and
advocate for democratic reform in the aftermath of Tunisia’s success,
gained support once the demonstrations had a visible impact on
government decision-making. The Internet shutdown encouraged those
who were in their homes trying to remain informed about the events in
their own city, the “Sofa Party” according to Mervat Madkour to
participate in the movement (Madkour 4/15/2012).
There is another side to information sharing, however. Mubarak’s
regime maintained tight control over traditional media outlets. After the
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protests became too large to ignore, the regime portrayed the
demonstrators camped out in Tahrir Square as foreign dissidents or
Iranians fomenting insurrection and instability. ISPs and mobile phone
service providers like Vodafone later claimed that their services had been
co-opted by the government to send out misinformation about the
nationality and intentions of the Tahrir protesters. This was what
encouraged pro-Mubarak protesters to enter Tahrir Square and attack the
#Jan25 demonstrators. Although this was just one use of NITs by the
government to disrupt the revolution, the overwhelming majority of
Twitter was part of the “consolidated generational opinion” cited by Han
(2011) in his description of demonstration effects.
Given that information sharing was the most prevalent category of
Twitter use and the information provided to protesters was the most
directly relevant to the success of the protests, this paper considers the
most important category for examination of the Twitter-created NPS
during the revolution was that of Critical Information for Calls to Action.
Early on in the movement, this critical information was focused on helping
protesters know that location or time of planned demonstrations. As
January 25th wore on, however, the CICTA tweets shifted to providing
information on updated locations as well as the police response. Later in
the day, instructions follow on how to prevent physical damage from tear
gas. The next series of tweets, beginning on January 27th, that serve as
critical information sharing are regarding the lack of Internet access.
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Some tweets report minor service outages, but as the transition to the
Chronic (Blackout) stage begins, a huge number of tweets report major
outages and indeed a near-complete shutdown. The one ISP that
maintained service for most of the blackout was Noor, left alone largely
due to its connections to the Egyptian stock market. Yet even leaving this
one connection open served to undermine the blackout policy. Tweets at
the beginning of the blackout allowed individual Noor customers to share
or unlock their Internet service to allow public use. When the co-opting of
Noor’s service was no longer an option, international companies had
developed strategies for providing service to protesters. CICTA tweets at
this time gave satellite phone numbers or ways to relay information
through Twitter by leaving a phone message, bypassing the need for an
Internet connection at all. After Internet service was restored on February
2, critical information focused primarily on the safety of protesters in
Tahrir Square, sending out the location of major street battles and
dissidents arrested. The leaderless nature of the movement caused
Mubarak’s regime to arrest bloggers and activists, including Wael Ghonim
of We Are All Khaled Said. Throughout the revolution, the CICTA
category underscores the decentralized nature and importance of the
networked public sphere. Further revisions of the Automatic Content
Analysis program hope to more accurately and fully illuminate each
category of tweets. Given the CICTA category’s importance to the
analysis, it was appropriate for this paper to analyze this category.
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Examinations of each individual category will serve to provide more
comprehensive information about the NPS, yet also require a more
detailed and accurate data-gathering method to understand and properly
interpret.

Conclusion
The increasing availability of large datasets and the capabilities to capture
additional datasets have great potential for advancing humanities’
understanding on the nature of NIT-created (NPS) which will have
dynamic effects on both democracy and our society in general.
Recognizing the importance of the NPS, the National Science Foundation
is soliciting a research proposal on how this NPS can enhance teaching
and learning programs in our K-12 educational system, which includes
improving student learning and engagement; optimizing personalized
instruction; and supporting adaptive, rapid decision-making. As clearly
expressed in NSF’s solicitation, it requires multidisciplinary efforts of the
consilience from pure science to humanities. This paper is an effort to
combine a political inquiry on the unprecedented success of the young
generation’s political mobilization with empirical evidence on the Arabic
youth’s use of online social media and Twitter through an Automatic
Content Analysis technique. Though manual annotation of a randomly
selected and representative sample can provide insight into the use of
Twitter, this paper believes that the development of a large NLP program
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that is capable of identifying and categorizing tweets from various datasets
can lead to a simpler and more efficient study of the Twitter-created NPS.
This paper presents a series of research results attempting to
explain the various uses of the Twitter-created NPS during the Egyptian
revolution in 2011. It is clear that the underlying sources of revolutionary
fervor initially came from the policies of Mubarak and his failure to
address the individual needs of ordinary Egyptians. Given Mubarak’s
emphasis on technological infrastructure for the purposes of economic
development, the emergence of an active young NIT-savvy generation
provided the mechanisms for mobilization. The Twitter revolutions in
Moldova and Iran in 2009, as well as the 2011 Tunisian revolution,
provided demonstration effects that inspired Egyptians to use the Internet
as a tool against the regime. However, there is another side to NIT
development. An increased infrastructure also provides oppressive
regimes with more invasive tactics and intelligence with which they can
consolidate and reinforce power.
This paper then establishes an analytical strategy to understand the
use of Twitter during the crisis. Finding relevant tweets from the NIST
Tweets2011 archive, it used manual annotation to develop categories that
could identify the various uses through the extraction of patterns within
the tweets’ content. The inaccuracy of the program, due to both the
concept of personal expression, limited translation capabilities, and
difficulty in acquiring specific data regarding multiple-category tweets,
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led this paper to compare the results of the manual annotation to the
automatic content analysis.
It is clear from both sets of results that Information Sharing (IS) is
a dominant function of the Twitter-created NPS. The variety of
information sharing includes general information, critical information for
calls to action, demonstration effects, and requests for information. The
DEMO subcategory suggests that the Egyptian movement was related to
the Tunisian Revolution less than one month earlier, and also had a
profound effect on other Arab Spring movements. The second most
prevalent category was Call to Action (CTA), which consisted of tweets
that urged the reader to perform a specific action. This was mainly due to
the calls for Internet action, either interactive (represented by the Retweet
(RET) category), or inherently one-sided (represented by the Link to
articles, photos, or videos (LINK) category). The fluctuations of Arabic
tweets indicates the effectiveness of Mubarak’s Internet blackout policy,
though it was unsustainable and led to economic failures and the
consolidation of international support against his regime. Additionally,
the decentralized nature of the NPS allowed some Egyptians to bypass the
blackout, continuing to inform outsiders of the events in the country. Yet
this decentralization also highlights the fact that the revolution brought
together a variety of groups with a variety of goals. In Tahrir Square, the
only common element among many the protesters was a desire to oust
Mubarak. Some demonstrators were more Islamic-oriented, and others
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were explicitly secular. Future studies of this dataset can try to take into
account the sentiment and goals of Twitter users. Though the process for
analyzing massive quantities of data created by NITs can undoubtedly be
improved, this paper serves as a template for future studies wishing to
examine the use of Twitter in a particular case.
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Honors Capstone Summary

The Egyptian Revolution in 2011 that ousted Hosni Mubarak from power
represented a shift in the foundations of revolutionary politics. After
having ruled Egypt for nearly 30 years, Mubarak resigned after18 days of
popular protests, lasting from January 25 to February 11, 2011. The
movement was decentralized, and crowds emerged quickly in various
places according to the protesters’ use of online social media (OSM) such
as Faebook, Youtube, and Twitter over the networked public sphere
(NPS). The NPS is a web of connections composed of technologies such
as cell phones and the Internet, as well as OSM. The government was
unable to respond competently to the threat posed by Internet use, at one
point even shutting off the country’s Internet connection in a futile effort
to quell the protesters. While the Western media was quick to label the
uprising as another “Twitter Revolution,” as they had in 2009 with Iran
and Moldova, and earlier in the Arab Spring with Tunisia, little empirical
evidence exists to support this claim. This paper hopes to provide some
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insight into the use of Twitter during this political crisis, and does so by
downloading and analyzing 37,613 tweets sent during the revolution. This
led to several major questions: What roles did Twitter play in the
revolution? What kinds of information were shared during this time? What
kinds of actions were called for? Can evidence of the demonstration effect
(which will be explained later) be found in the tweets sent? Is Twitter
largely an interactive or non-interactive form of communication? How did
Twitter use change during different stages of the revolution? Finally, what
effects, if any, did Mubarak’s total Internet shutdown have on the use of
Twitter during the revolution that brought down his regime?
The first section of the paper discusses the variety of factors that
contributed to the uprising in Egypt in order to properly contextualize the
role of OSM and the NPS. Demographically, the emergence of a large
young generation played an important role. The median age in Egypt, a
country of 80 million people, is 24.3. 61% of the population is younger
than 40. These people had grown up entirely under Mubarak’s rule, and
were not satisfied by the results of his policies after 30 years. Life politics
(an idea put forward by Anthony Giddens in 1991) is the notion that
political movements are no longer defined primarily by charismatic
figures and anti-colonialist sentiment, but rather issues affecting the
everyday lives of citizens. Mubarak’s regime struggled with many of these
“life politics” categories, with inflation at 11% (from 2010-2011), a 24%
unemployment rate among youths, a GDP of $6,200, and a score of 3.8 on
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Transparency International’s “Perceived Corruption Index” (scaled from
1-10 with 10 being the least corrupt). One factor in which Egypt was
improving dramatically was the literacy rate. The overall literacy rate
among Egyptians is 66%, yet among youths this jumps to 82% for females
and 88% for males. While indicating an increased capacity for education,
this figure does not take into account the inequality in educational
services. Many young Egyptians, often in rural areas, remained
uneducated, a segment of the young generation arose that was capable of
understanding and communicating their complaints in a coherent fashion.
This was the critical group that initiated the demonstrations during January
and February 2011. The young generation at the center of the protest
movements were also technologically literate, developing relationships
with the virtual networked public sphere that they could not with the
physical public sphere. The initial protests were, to some extent,
mobilized, organized, and expedited by OSM, and that the actualization of
these protests on the ground encouraged normally inactive citizens to
participate in a drive for political change. In looking at the role of Twitter
in the demonstrations, it was difficult to develop an effective analytical
strategy due to the relative youth of the technology. We decided to use
Han’s (2012) strategy of Automatic Content Analysis, as will be described
later.
In order to make Han’s analysis feasible and relevant, obtaining a
detailed chronology was important to set understand the nature of Twitter
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use. The revolution was divided according to Fisk’s Four Stages of
Political Crises: Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic, and Resolution. In the
prodrome stage, events and sentiments build toward a breaking point.
Egypt’s prodrome was marked by smaller protests and the emergence of
an online presence unafraid to discuss blatant police corruption,
unemployment, or the Tunisian Revolution of 2011 that ousted another
presumably established Arab leader. The prodromal problems culminated
in an Outbreak, or major event that sparked the political crisis. In Egypt,
the January 25 protests were the first major protests, called for online and
realized in the streets. The protests persisted, with misinformation and
confusion prevalent among the Egyptian population. The Chronic stage
began on January 28, when Mubarak made the decision to cut off the
Internet, hoping to silence communication between protesters. Ironically,
this policy actually brought more Egyptians to the streets, as they no
longer had computers to use. The shutdown was also ineffective because it
damaged the Egyptian economy while encouraging the decentralized
networked public sphere to find new and uncontrollable ways to share and
receive information. International media providers voluntarily worked
with Egyptians to improve service, with Google even enabling
Speak2Tweet technology that allowed people to send out messages by
leaving a voicemail. The flexibility of Twitter as a communication tool is
another reason to analyze the content of the data sent. Violence broke out
after the shutdown was lifted, marking the beginning of a Chronic (Post-
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Blackout) stage, which is used for the analysis later. While the violence
subsided, the crowds were still present in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and many
other locations, leading to Mubarak’s resignation (the Resolution stage) on
February 11.
In order to perform the aforementioned Automatic Content
Analysis, Professor Han, myself, and graduate student Dong-yoon Han
downloaded the National Institute of Statistics’ Tweets2011 Archive,
containing 16 million tweets collected between January 23 and February
8, 2011. Dong-yoon Han downloaded the tweets and began creating a
program that could conduct the analysis that would correctly interpret this
huge number of tweets. Of the 37,613-tweet database we found to contain
hash tags related to the revolution, a random sample was taken from each
stage represented in the archive (Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic (Blackout),
and Chronic (Post-Blackout)). These samples were manually annotated to
create general categories that could be identified by key patterns or
phrases in a computer program. These categories included, for example,
Information Sharing (IS), Call to Action (CTA), Expression of Support
(ES), and Opinion (O). Each of these categories was related to a series of
key patterns that the Automatic Content Analysis program could identify
and extract from the large tweet database, theoretically providing an
accurate account of Twitter use during each stage.
Another benefit of the manual analysis is that the qualitative study
of tweets is important, providing a nuanced and accurate analysis of that
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small group of tweets. After all, Twitter is a form of personal expression,
and, as was reinforced through this research, there are very few definitive
categories related to individuality and personal expression. The most
difficult aspect of creating an Automatic Content Analysis was developing
an accurate program that identified and categorized a great number of
tweets, and after several revisions, this still remains a problem. However,
the error analysis strategy is slowly adding credibility to the program, and
continued work will likely provide usable data and a framework for future
Twitter research.
The tentative results as of the time of creating this Honors
Capstone Project suggest that Information Sharing was the prominent use
of Twitter throughout the revolution. Though calls for Internet activism
were also prevalent, the primary purpose of Twitter during the political
crisis was to inform readers. By providing general information, protesters
could update those outside of Egypt on the events, and by providing
critical information, protesters could learn of police tactics or new ways to
circumvent the Internet blackout.
Though relatively raw, this type of research is incredibly important
because as of now there are no standard methods for studying the massive
quantities of data escaping from the networked public sphere. The
technology is simply too new and the amount of data too great to deal with
qualitatively (although this would be ideal due to the personal expression
limitations mentioned above). By looking into the Egyptian revolution as a
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case study, this paper hopes to increase awareness and strategies of
Twitter researchers to benefit the future study of Twitter during political
crises and other times.

